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The Challenges of Prosecuting the Destruction of the Natural Environment as a War Crime before 
the International Criminal Court and Preferable Alternatives 
 
Historical experiences have shown that war will always be harmful to the natural environment. Due to urgent 
global challenges threatening environmental systems, there is a need for international measures that limit 
and condemn wartime destruction of the natural environment. To this end, this study brings four themes to 
light. First, when it comes to wartime environmental protection, instruments which incorporate an ecocentric 
perspective, meaning that they recognize and safeguard the environment as an entity with intrinsic value, 
are preferable to anthropocentric ones, which only protect the environment to the extent it benefits 
humankind. The latter approach, which has been generally adopted in international law instruments 
applicable to the environment during armed conflict, fails to recognize that the wellbeing of humankind is 
interconnected with that of the environment. It is consequently an inadequate approach for dealing with 
contemporary challenges, such as climate change and the rapid loss of biodiversity. Second, the 
deficiencies in the international humanitarian law (IHL) applicable to the natural environment are replicated 
in international criminal law. These shortcomings include (i) the lack of clarity regarding the scope of 
protection; (ii) the use of imprecise yet stringent terms and principles that condone a high level of 
environmental damage; and (iii) the absence of protection applicable during internal armed conflicts. Third, 
this study develops from the assumption that criminalizing certain environmental destruction and thereby 
engendering accountability for such wrongdoing is in the international community’s interest. International 
criminal liability can address impunity for wartime environmental damage and encourage compliance with 
applicable legal instruments. Finally, the fragmentation of international law applicable to the environment 
during armed conflict can be beneficial in addressing the lack of accountability for environmental damage. 
The different legal regimes discussed in this study can be applied to different situations to achieve favorable 
results because their fundamental principles are compatible with one another.  
 
This study begins by analyzing various interpretations of the “natural environment” proposed by 
international instruments and adopting a working definition. It then goes on to address the different 
perspectives on environmental damage and argue in favor of the ecocentric approach. Following a brief 
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overview of what wartime environmental damage looks like using a series of examples, the study goes on 
to examine the international legal regimes offering wartime protection to the environment: international 
environmental law (IEL), IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). Other applicable regimes, like 
international trade law or the law of the sea, will not be addressed. Similarly, other mechanisms that can 
be used to enforce international obligations, including State responsibility and civil liability, will not be 
discussed, as this study only focuses on international criminal liability before the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). After reviewing the mechanisms available for enforcing the legal regimes examined, the viability of 
prosecuting the destruction of the natural environment as a war crime before the ICC is considered. This 
chapter will look at environmental destruction as a crime under Article 2(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute and as an 
underlying act in prosecuting other crimes, while considering the Office of the Prosecutor’s recent policy 
goals. This study determines that the challenges of prosecuting the destruction of the natural environment 
as a war crime reflect the same deficiencies found in IHL instruments. In exploring alternatives to 
prosecuting environmental destruction as a war crime, the viability of prosecuting environmental destruction 
as other crimes under the ICC Statute; amending the ICC Statute to introduce a new crime against the 
environment; creating new mechanisms to impose individual criminal liability; and using the fragmentation 
of international law to foster compliance will be considered. This study concludes that the best avenue for 
developing meaningful environmental jurisprudence is to amend the ICC Statute and introduce a new crime 
against the environment.  
 
I. Defining the Environment and What Amounts to its Destruction 
 
i. A Working Definition of the (Natural) Environment 
 
A commonly accepted definition of the “environment” is absent in international law. The definitions that have 
been proposed by international instruments identify what should be protected and consequently differ 
according to the purpose they aim to achieve.1 In international environmental law (IEL), formulations are 
                                                 
1 Doug Weir, “We Need to Define ‘The Environment’ to Protect it from Armed Conflict” (11 February 2016) 
The Toxic Remnants of War Project. 
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broader and clearer than those found in international humanitarian law (IHL), which applies exclusively 
during armed conflict. For example, the Stockholm Declaration, encompassing twenty-six non-binding 
principles to guide the development of international law, refers to the “human environment”. It therefore sets 
out to not only protect the “natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and 
especially representative samples of natural ecosystems” but also to address the social, economic and 
cultural implications of these elements.2 By contrast, the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions [API], which identifies who and what should be protected during an international armed 
conflict, equates the “natural environment” to the “system of inextricable interrelations between living 
organisms and their inanimate environment”.3 API purposely avoids using the term “human environment”, 
which refers to the “external conditions and influences which affect the life, development and the survival 
of the civilian population and living organisms”.4 It follows that instruments referring to “natural” elements 
generally include the physical conditions of land, air and water, whereas instruments incorporating a 
“human” dimension to the environment address broader subject matter, such as health, social and cultural 
regulations.5 Other IHL instruments, like the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques [ENMOD], neglect defining the environment altogether.6 
More recently, the United Nations Environment Programme, the body tasked with coordinating the global 
environmental agenda, adopted a broad definition by interpreting the environment as “[t]he sum of all 
external conditions affecting the life, development and survival of an organism”, including the “physical 
conditions that affect natural resources (climate, geology, hazards) and the ecosystem services that sustain 
them.”7  
 
                                                 
2 UNGA “Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment” (16 June 1972) UN 
Doc A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973) (Stockholm Declaration), Principle 2.  
3 Yves Sandoz et al (eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) para 1451. 
4 ibid para 1451. 
5 Marie-Louise Larsson, The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 156. 
6 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (adopted 18 May 1977, entered into force 5 October 1978) 1108 UNTS 152 (ENMOD). 
7 UN Environment Programme, “Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict: An Inventory and 
Analysis of International Law” (UNEP 2009) 56. 
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Without a precise definition of the “environment”, there is uncertainty about which objects benefit from the 
protection of IHL instruments. On the one hand, precise and expansive interpretations like those found in 
IEL are controversial in this context because they could include elements like public and private property, 
natural resources with commercial value, and even cultural heritage.8 On the other, the broadest 
perspectives can qualify any manifestation as the “environment”.9 There is also debate about whether the 
“natural environment” is protected as a civilian object during armed conflict.10 By excluding “human” 
elements, IHL instruments create confusion between the terms “civilian object” and “natural environment”, 
which should not be mutually exclusive, and deny the scientific reality that the wellbeing of the environment 
is connected to the wellbeing of humankind.11 In light of this uncertainty, the “human” dimension should be 
combined with the “natural” in order to formulate a precise definition of the environment in the context of 
war.12  
 
For the purposes of this study, the expansive working definition adopted by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) will be used. This “includes natural resources, both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, 
soil, fauna and flora and the interaction between the same factors, and the characteristics of the 
landscape”.13 States had urged the ILC to clarify what is meant by the “environment” in relation to armed 
conflicts during its recent study on the subject.14 This definition, as previously used in the Draft Principles 
on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, ultimately 
embraced “human” elements by drawing inspiration from the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage [World Heritage Convention].15 The World Heritage Convention defined 
                                                 
8 Cymie R Payne, “Defining the Environment: Environmental Integrity” in Carsten Stahn et al (eds) 
Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace (OUP 2017) 41. 
9 ibid 45. 
10 Michael Bothe, “The Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: Legal Rules, 
Uncertainty, Deficiencies and Possible Developments” (1991) 34 German Ybk Intl L 54 in Karen Hulme 
(ed), Law of the Environment and Armed Conflict (Elgar Publishing 2017) 239. 
11 Weir (n1).   
12 Larsson (n5) 175. 
13 ILC, “Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts” (30 May 
2014) UN Doc A/CN.4/674, para 86. 
14 UNGA Sixth Committee (70th Session) “Summary Record of the 24th Meeting” (4 December 2015) UN 
Doc A/C.6/70/SR.24, para 69. 
15 Preliminary Report (n13) paras 79-86; ILC, “Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in 
Relation to Armed Conflicts” (28 May 2015) UN Doc A/CN.4/685, para 224; ILC, “Third Report on the 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts” (3 June 2016) UN Doc A/CN.4/700, para 193. 
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natural heritage as “natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such 
formations…, geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute 
the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants… and natural sites or precisely delineated natural 
areas” that have “outstanding universal value” from a scientific, conservationist or aesthetic perspective.16 
The ILC’s expansive interpretation can therefore clarify and facilitate the consistent application of IHL 
before, during and after armed conflict, and especially in the context of post-conflict accountability for 
environmental damage.17 
 
ii. Perspectives on Environmental Damage  
 
In addition to disputed definitions of the “environment”, there is disagreement about whether there should 
be a threshold of magnitude - and about what that threshold should be - for environmental damage to qualify 
as legally material.18 The definition of transnational environmental damage, especially that amounting to 
crime, is contentious. The question depends on what instrument is defining the harm and what criteria are 
used in assessing the acts causing damage.19 Although a distinction between global, regional and local 
environmental damage may be identified, geographical classifications are becoming less relevant. While 
issues concerning matters like waste management and transboundary pollution may initially have local or 
regional effects, they are increasingly interconnected with global problems like biodiversity loss, climate 
change, deforestation and desertification, which do not heed national boundaries.20 Instead, the 
classification of harm is better understood in terms of the “environmental victim” it affects. This represents 
the idea that environmental injury can be caused by intentional or reckless acts or by omission, to either 
humankind (anthropocentrism) or to the environment as such (ecocentrism).21 These two competing 
                                                 
16 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 23 
November 1972, entered into force 15 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151 (World Heritage Convention) art 
2.  
17 Rosemary Rayfuse, “Introduction: Rethinking International Law and the Protection of the Environment in 
Relation to Armed Conflict” in Rosemary Rayfuse (ed) War and the Environment: New Approaches to 
Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 4; Weir (n1). 
18 Payne (n8) 45. 
19 Rob White, Transnational Environmental Crime: Toward an Eco-Global Criminology (Routledge 2011) 
3.  
20 Larsson (n5) 157.  
21 White (n19) 109. 
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perspectives on the relationship between humans and the natural environment can be used to classify 
environmental harm. The anthropocentric perspective, which is commonly found in international 
instruments, reflects human self-interest. It views humans as separate from the natural environment and 
considers the wellbeing of non‐human ecosystems only insofar as it stands to benefit humans.22  In other 
words, anthropocentrism tolerates any level of harm to the natural environment as long as it does not affect 
humankind. This exclusive focus on the well-being of humans without guarantees for the environment’s 
intrinsic value is a critical shortcoming of international instruments because it fails to protect the environment 
for its own sake.23  The scientific reality that human welfare is dependent on the long‐term survival of non‐
human entities is neglected in this approach.24 In contrast, the ecocentric perspective is based on the idea 
that human activity is interconnected with nature and that the environment is worth protecting in itself. 
Ecocentrism recognizes that a shift in perspective is necessary to respond to current challenges.25 
 
iii. The Environmental Impact of Warfare   
 
The dramatic consequences that recent armed conflicts have had on the environment coupled with the 
contemporary challenges threatening the wellbeing of our planet expose the critical need for international 
mechanisms that limit wartime damage to the natural environment. Keeping in line with the ecocentric 
perspective, the environment should be protected during armed conflict because its wellbeing is indivisible 
from the wellbeing of humankind.26 Moreover, the impact of warfare should not prevent present and future 
generations from enjoying and utilising the environment. Conflict-related damage that hinders socio-
economic advancement is contrary to the goals of sustainable development, which strive to improve 
                                                 
22 Avi Brisman & Nigel South, “Green Criminology and Environmental Crimes and Harm” (2019) 13 
Sociology Compass 1, 4. 
23 Catherine Redgewell, “Life, the Universe and Everything: A Critique of Anthopocentric Rights” in Alan 
Boyle & Michael R Anderson (eds) Human Rights Approaches to Environmental (Clarendon Press 1996) 
71. 
24 Brisman & South (n22) 4. 
25 ibid 5. 
26 Michael Bothe, “The Ethics, Principles and Objectives of Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed 
Conflict” in Rosemary Rayfuse (ed), War and the Environment: New Approaches to Protecting the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 92. 
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conditions for present generations without compromising future potential.27 Yet it is difficult to predict the 
risks and consequences of environmental damage caused by warfare and to identify which conduct will 
cause long-term or irreversible effects.28 However, even though, “it is not easy to know in advance exactly 
what the scope and duration of some environmentally damaging acts will be… there is a need to limit as 
far as possible environmental damage even in cases where [the degree of damage] is not certain…”.29  This 
need is illustrated by the environmental damage produced by recent armed conflicts., the ongoing effects 
of which continue to linger today.    
 
During the Vietnam War, the United States military intentionally targeted the environment in order to weaken 
its adversary. Military herbicides, including Agent Orange, were used to spray more than five million acres 
of vegetation and food crops, leading to the contamination of millions of trees and the poisoning of animal 
species and water sources.30 Systematic plowing using heavily armored bulldozers cleared close to one 
million acres of vegetation.31 Exploded munitions created an estimated 26 million craters displacing soil, 
destroying arable land and disrupting the timber industry.32 Moreover, it was reported that artificial 
rainmaking techniques were used to cause flooding in an attempt to disorient enemy forces by disrupting 
communication and transit networks.33 During the Gulf War, Iraqi forces also intentionally targeted the 
environment by spilling oil wells into the Persian Gulf and igniting them. The fires burned for months, 
releasing dangerous chemicals into the atmosphere. Exploded or damaged wells contaminated soil, 
drinking water and agricultural crops by creating large flammable lakes.34 Military operations during this 
armed conflict also degraded the fragile desert terrain, the wildlife and the residential areas in the region.35 
                                                 
27 Onita Das, Environmental Protection, Security and Armed Conflict: A Sustainable Development 
Perspective (Elgar Publishing 2013) 124. 
28 ibid 123.  
29 UNSG, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed 
Conflict” (29 July 1993) UN Doc A/48/269, para 34. 
30 Richard A Falk, “Environmental Warfare and Ecocide – Facts, Appraisal and Proposals” (1973) 4 Security 
Dialogue 80, in Karen Hulme (ed) Law of the Environment and Armed Conflict (Elgar Publishing 2017) 112. 
31 ibid 113. 
32 ibid 115. 
33 Hans Blix, “Arms Control Treaties Aimed at Reducing the Military Impact on the Environment” in Karen 
Hulme (ed), Law of the Environment and Armed Conflict (Elgar Publishing 2017) 134. 
34 Peter H Sand, “Compensation for Environmental Damage from the 1991 Gulf War” (2005) 35(6) Env 
Policy & L 244 in Karen Hulme (ed) Law of the Environment and Armed Conflict (Elgar Publishing 2017) 
318. 
35 Das (n27) 143-146. 
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In the Kosovo War, even though the environment was not the direct target of attacks, it was indirectly 
affected when an industrial complex containing several chemical plants was destroyed. The chemicals were 
released into the Danube River, contaminating the drinking water, polluting the air and soil, and 
endangering the wildlife in the region.36 In the Afghanistan War, in addition to the destruction of an estimated 
10,000 villages, military operations led to the contamination of water sources and a significant loss of 
wildlife.37 Moreover, the physical, chemical and explosive remnants of these wars threaten ecosystems. 
Their presence undermines the economic viability of nearby natural resources while their destruction 
threatens the ecosystems in which they remain.38 
 
In addition to the damage brought about by armed conflict, the contemporary challenges facing the 
environment are likely to exacerbate the effects of warfare. Although developments like climate change, 
drought and the loss of biodiversity do not instigate wars alone, they may play a significant role in 
aggravating conflicts.39 For example, competition over finite natural sources contributed to past wars and 
will continue to do so, especially considering the impact of climate change.40 The effects of climate change 
are likely to extend beyond increases in temperature, flooding, extreme weather and soil erosion, as these 
events will also cause socio-economic consequences.41 Phenomena like droughts, extreme heat and 
desertification will therefore lead to the loss of agricultural land, food sources and drinking water.42 As water 
sources are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of armed conflict, its protection should be vigorously 
pursued.43 Similarly, special protection is needed to prevent the destruction of animal habitats during armed 
                                                 
36 ibid 163-169. 
37 Karmanye Thadani & Rohit Ayyagari, “Law of Armed Conflict and the Environment” (2015) 45 Env 
Policy & L 285, 288. 
38 Doug Weir, “Reframing the Remnants of War: The Role of the International Law Commission, 
Governments and Civil Society” in Carsten Stahn et al (eds) Environmental Protection and Transitions 
from Conflict to Peace (OUP 2017) 438. 
39 Das (n27) 83. 
40 ibid. 
41 Stephen Farrall et al, “Introduction: Exploring the Legal and Criminological Consequences of Climate 
Change: An Introduction” in Stephen Farrall et al (eds) Criminological and Legal Consequences of Climate 
Change (Hart Publishing 2012) 1. 
42 Mara Tignino, “Water, International Peace and Security” (2010) 92(879) Intl Rev Red Cross 647 in Karen 
Hulme (ed) Law of the Environment and Armed Conflict (Elgar Publishing 2017) 770. 
43 ibid 795. 
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conflicts.44 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo45, Mozambique46 and the Sahara-Sahel47, internal 
armed conflicts have led to extensive loss of biodiversity. Given these increasingly urgent threats, 
international law mechanisms that adequately protect the environment during armed conflict and enforce 
compliance with such protections are vital. 
 
III. International Law Mechanisms Protecting the Environment 
 
The environment is protected by multiple bodies of law, including international environmental law (IEL), 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). As previously discussed, 
due to current ecological threats, the environment must be protected during peacetime as well as armed 
conflict. While IEL is traditionally viewed as the law regulating the environment during times of peace, IHL 
is the law specifically governing armed conflict.48 However, when it comes to the protection of the 
environment, international law is fragmented.49  In other words, due to the expansion and diversification of 
the various regimes that regulate environmental protections, IEL, IHL and IHRL risk overlapping and 
conflicting with one other, as they each provide distinct principles and institutions.50 Yet despite the risk of 
incompatible practices competing against one another as suggested by fragmentation, this chapter will 
demonstrate that the principles of IEL, IHL and IHRL are compatible. The protection of the environment 
during armed conflict is best achieved through the joint application of all three legal regimes.   
 
                                                 
44 Brendan Kearns, “When Bonobos Meet Guerillas: Preserving Biodiversity on the Battlefield” (2012) 24(2) 
Georgetown Intl Env L Rev 123 in Karen Hulme (ed) Law of the Environment and Armed Conflict (Elgar 
Publishing 2017) 704. 
45 ibid 699; Britta Sjostedt, “The Role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Armed Conflict: Green-
Keeping in Virunga Park - Applying the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in the Armed Conflict of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2013) 82 Nordic J Intl L 129, 132. 
46 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Natural Environment: Neglected Victim of Armed Conflict” (5 
June 2019) ICRC.  
47 Jonathan Watts, “Make Environmental Damage a War Crime, Say Scientists” (24 July 2019) The 
Guardian.  
48 Kirsten Stefanik, “The Environment and Armed Conflict: Employing General Principles to Protect the 
Environment” in Carsten Stahn et al (eds) Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to 
Peace (OUP 2017) 93. 
49 Bothe (n26) 92. 
50 Stefanik (n48) 98-99; Julian Wyatt, “Law-Making at the Intersection of International Environmental, 
Humanitarian and Criminal Law: The Issue of Damage to the Environment in International Armed Conflict” 
(2010) 92(879) Intl Rev Red Cross 593, 595. 
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i. International Environmental Law  
 
The IEL instruments that protect the environment include binding treaties as well as non-binding 
declarations and resolutions. These instruments offer protection that is relevant in peacetime and wartime.51 
Multilateral environmental treaties generally contain loosely worded provisions and share the ability to 
cooperate with other institutions in international law in order to facilitate compliance and address 
environmental protection during these various stages.52 However, IEL lacks a UN - mandated umbrella 
organization for coordinating policies, harmonizing conventions and monitoring implementation in relation 
to the environment.53 Compared to other legal regimes, IEL is a new branch of international law, as 
instruments that exclusively focus on environmental protection primarily emerged after the Second World 
War.54 The first treaties addressing the environment were bilateral agreements that dealt with the 
management of natural resources and wildlife from an anthropocentric perspective.55  These early 
agreements had a utilitarian purpose and only protected the environment incidentally.56 Throughout the 
mid-twentieth century, various multilateral agreements were adopted to regulate the commercial aspects of 
the environment.57  
 
The subsequent development of IEL can be understood by examining the three consecutively adopted 
declarations which brought the importance of environmental protections and sustainable development to 
the international forum: the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration and the Johannesburg Declaration.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Britta Sjostedt, “The Ability of Environmental Treaties to Address Environmental Problems in Post-
Conflict” in Carsten Stahn et al (eds) Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace 
(OUP 2017) 73. 
52 ibid. 
53 Stefanik (n48) 103. 
54 Ulrich Beyerlin & Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Hart 2011) 3.  
55 Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (CUP 2009) 3. 
56 Beyerlin (n54) 3.  
57 Stephens (n55) 3. 
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The Stockholm Declaration 
The UNGA first proposed a forum for effectively addressing emerging environmental problems in 1968.58 
The ensuing UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 produced two non-binding legal 
documents: the Stockholm Declaration, encompassing the twenty-six fundamental principles to guide and 
consolidate the development of IEL, and an accompanying action plan.59 Although the Declaration 
recognized the importance of preserving the environment for future generations it also emphasized the 
value of protecting it for its own sake.60 The Stockholm Conference therefore prompted the adoption of 
increasingly ecocentric international agreements, including the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)61 and the environmental protection rules in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).62 Similarly, it inspired a series of non-binding instruments, 
like the 1982 World Charter for Nature63 and the World Commission on Environment and Development’s 
report, Our Common Future, which articulated the first definition of sustainable development.64 Yet the most 
significant outcome of the Conference was the establishment of UNEP as the first UN institution tasked 
with protecting the environment. However, because UNEP was established by a UNGA Resolution, it does 
not possess international legal personality like other UN specialized agencies.65 Nevertheless, the 
institution has significantly contributed to the development of IEL, as will be later discussed.66  
 
The Rio Declaration 
In an effort to “elaborate strategies and measures to halt and reverse the effects of environmental 
degradation in the context of increased national and international efforts to promote sustainable and 
                                                 
58 UNGA, “Resolution 2398: Problems of the Human Environment” (3 December 1968) UN Doc 
A/Res/2398(XXIII). 
59 Stockholm Declaration (n2).  
60 Stephens (n55) 3-4. 
61 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (adopted 03 March 
1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 993 UNTS 243.  
62 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS). 
63 UNGA, “World Charter for Nature” (28 October 1982) UN Doc A/Res/37/7.  
64 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 1987). 
65 UNGA, “Resolution 2997: Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental 
Cooperation” (15 December 1972) UN Doc A/Res/2997(XXVII).  
66 Beyerlin (n54) 8. 
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environmentally sound development”,67 the UN convened the 1992 Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). As the previous conference did not address climate change and the loss of 
biodiversity, these were key topics discussed at UNCED.68 The Conference led to the adoption of a series 
of soft law instruments, including the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development69 and its 
accompanying action programme for implementation, Agenda 21.70 Notably, Principle 24 of the Rio 
Declaration recognized that “[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development” and called upon 
States to “respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and 
co-operate in its further development, as necessary.”71  Moreover, due to UNCED’s  focus on climate 
change, the previously negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) received a 
large number of signatures during the Conference.72 By obliging states to mitigate the adverse effects of 
climate change, the UNFCCC became the international community’s key response to the issue.73 In 1997, 
the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention introduced legally enforceable emissions targets for 
countries for a period lasting until 2020.74 To continue the UNFCCC’s goals beyond this year, the Paris 
Agreement was subsequently adopted with the goal of limiting global warming.75 Yet all three instruments 
reflect a limited anthropocentric perspective that disregards the interrelation between human wellbeing and 
the wellbeing of the natural environment.76 Following UNCED, the international community also adopted a 
series of legally binding instruments, including the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)77 
                                                 
67 UNGA, “Resolution 44/228: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development” (22 
December 1989) UN Doc A/Res/44/228, 151 
68 Stephens (n55) 4. 
69 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), “Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development” (13 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I). 
70 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), “Agenda 21: Programme of Action for 
Sustainable Development” (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/Conf.151/26.  
71 Rio Declaration (n69). 
72 Beyerlin (n54) 14. 
73 Matthew Hall, “State Responsibility for the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on Individuals: Assessing 
the Potential for an Interdisciplinary Approach” in Stephen Farrall et al (eds) Criminological and Legal 
Consequences of Climate Change (Hart Publishing 2012) 224-225. 
74 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 
December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 22 (1998).  
75 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.  
76 Hall (n73) 224-225. 
77 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa (adopted 17 June 1994, entered into force 26 December 1996) 1954 
UNTS 3 (UNCCD).  
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and the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters78, which sought to create new environmental obligations for States.79 
 
The Johannesburg Declaration 
The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development sought to reaffirm the international community’s 
commitment to achieving the goals previously articulated at UNCED.80 The Johannesburg Declaration 
was negotiated and adopted at the summit as evidence of an ongoing effort to apply a framework of 
sustainable development to IEL.81 Yet rather than creating new international environmental agreements, 
the third conference focused on improving compliance with instruments already in effect.82 Although the 
three conferences and subsequent declarations prompted debate about meaningful environmental 
protection, States have since failed to resolve the urgent challenges identified by UNCED, including 
climate change and the loss of biodiversity.83  
 
In addition to the instruments that emerged from previously discussed conferences, the environment is also 
protected by the customary international legal (CIL) principles of IEL. CIL consists of “international custom, 
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”84 It therefore refers to obligations that arise from 
“constant and uniform” State practice coupled with the “belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of the rule of law requiring it”.85 Generally accepted fundamental principles of IEL include: the 
principle of sustainable development; the principle of intergenerational equity; the principle of precaution; 
the no harm principle; and the principle of cooperation.86 First, as previously discussed, sustainable 
development seeks to improve economic conditions for present generations without compromising the 
                                                 
78 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (adopted 28 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001) 2161 UNTS 447 
(Aarhus Convention).  
79 Beyerlin (n54) 20. 
80 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (UNWSSD), “Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development” (4 September 2002) UN Doc A/Conf.199/20. 
81 Das (n27) 15. 
82 Beyerlin (n54) 23. 
83 Das (n27) 18. 
84 North Sea Continental Shelf (Judgment) ICJ [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 71.  
85 ibid para 77. 
86 Stefanik (n48) 103. 
15 
 
future potential of natural resources.87 Similarly, the principle of intergenerational equity, as articulated in 
Principles 1 and 2 of the Stockholm Declaration, requires concern for the living conditions of future 
generations.88 The principle of precaution requires international law actors  (primarily States) to take 
measures to protect the environment even in the absence of scientific certainty about the risk of 
environmental damage.89 The prohibition of significant transboundary harm, or the “no-harm” principle, was 
first articulated in the Trail Smelter arbitration ruling, which stated that “under the principles of international 
law… no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by 
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”.90 This finding was later 
confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case, which recognized  that  
“every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
States” is based on “certain general and well-recognized principles”. 91 This “no-harm” principle is further 
reiterated in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which oblige 
States to ensure that “activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’”.92 The principle of cooperation, as 
articulated in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, further obliges States to “cooperate in a spirit of global 
partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem”.93 
Yet despite these emerging fundamental principles and the progress made in recognizing the protection of 
the environment as an important objective of international law, there are challenges to enforcing CIL 
because of difficulties in ascertaining when an emerging practice has become accepted as a binding 
principle of IEL, and to identifying the exact content of the practice.94      
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ii. International Humanitarian Law  
IHL includes the set of rules, stemming from both treaties and custom, that protect the environment by 
limiting the effects of armed conflict. These rules do not protect the environment during internal tensions, 
disturbances or sporadic acts of violence, but rather only apply once an armed conflict begins.95 IHL 
distinguishes between an international armed conflict (IAC), which is a conflict involving two or more 
States96, and a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), which is a conflict restricted to the territory of a 
single State and involves either State forces fighting armed dissidents or armed groups fighting one other.97 
Consequently, the natural environment enjoys different protections depending on the type of conflict 
involved.   
 
Despite the environmental despoliation caused by armed conflict throughout history, environmental 
destruction has only recently emerged as a separate category of damage.98 Consequently, the law 
protecting the natural environment during armed conflict directly derives from: (i) provisions of API expressly 
drafted to address environmental protection and (ii) the ENMOD Convention, while the law providing indirect 
protection derives from (iii) other IHL treaties that regulate means and methods of warfare; and (iv) 
customary principles of IHL. Although IEL instruments have begun adopting an ecocentric approach, IHL 
instruments continue to treat environmental protection from an anthropocentric perspective. There are few 
provisions in IHL instruments that address the protection of the natural environment directly, and those that 
do address the subject do so for the benefit of limiting the human suffering that such destruction may 
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implicate.99 For this reason, some have argued that the strongest protections that IHL confer on the 
environment stem from non-specific customary principles.100  
 
Additional Protocol I  
API supplemented the 1949 Geneva Conventions by clarifying and expanding the rules of IHL applicable 
during international armed conflicts.101 Despite the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ failure to address wartime 
environmental destruction directly, API introduced an obligation to that end. Article 35 prohibits the use of 
“methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment.”102 Article 55 reiterates this prohibition but adds a positive 
obligation by requiring that “[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment” in order to 
avoid damage that brings “prejudice to the health or survival of the population”.103 It also prohibits reprisals 
against the natural environment.104 Although Articles 35 and 55 have the same effects and do not 
distinguish between deliberate or collateral environmental damage, the additional element of consequent 
human harm present in Article 55(1) renders the provision anthropocentric to the disadvantage of the 
natural environment.105 In other words, an attack that is expected to cause damage to the natural 
environment without impacting the human population is not precluded by this provision.106 This approach 
fails to consider the value of shielding the environment during war as an end in itself.107 Nevertheless, the 
“care” obligation may be interpreted as requiring States to positive steps to keep the environment safe from 
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damage. Such steps could include, for example, conducting rigorous investigations about the potential 
environmental impact of an attack prior to carrying it out and, depending on the results of the assessment, 
changing or abandoning the plan.108  
 
In addition to the protection gap caused by API’s failure to adopt an ecocentric approach, the threshold of 
what constitutes “widespread, long-term and severe damage” is too high to meaningfully safeguard the 
natural environment during armed conflict.109 The travaux préparatoires provided little guidance to 
interpreting the meaning of these terms except to confirm that “long-term” means “a matter of decades”.110 
Consequently, attacks expected to cause short-term damage to the environment are not prohibited by these 
provisions.111 Although some interpretations have been proposed by the academic community, in the 
absence of a precise and commonly accepted definition of these terms, it is difficult for States to identify 
when damage to the environment violates the provision.112 As all three qualifiers must be satisfied, attacks 
on the natural environment would therefore only be prohibited in very limited situations.113 Moreover, it is 
problematic that API only addresses the “means and methods  which are intended or may be expected” to 
cause damage, given that an attack could harm the environment in ways that are difficult to observe, predict 
or even understand.114    
 
The question of whether API also protects the natural environment as a civilian object is controversial. 
Arguments in favor of the environment qualifying as a civilian object point to the Protocol, which provides 
that “all objects which are not military objectives” are civilian.115 The environment will therefore qualify as a 
civilian object if by its “nature, location, purpose or use [it does not] make an effective contribution to military 
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action” and as longs as its “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling 
at the time [does not offer] a definite military advantage”.116 Under such an interpretation, elements of the 
natural environment which do not contribute to the military effort would also enjoy the treaty and customary 
protections afforded to civilian objects during armed conflict.117 Arguments to the contrary point to the 
environment’s unique attributes – its interconnectedness, its intangible features and its irreplaceability – to 
demonstrate that it is inappropriate to categorize it as a civilian “object”.118 Such claims also maintain that 
if the drafters had wanted the natural environment to qualify as a civilian object, they would have simply 
clarified this in the text.119 However, an examination into how API is structured is most telling, as Article 55 
appears in Part IV, which deals with the “Civilian Population”, and more specifically, in the chapter entitled 
“Civilian Objects”. It is therefore apparent that while the natural environment can qualify as a civilian object.  
 
Yet some have argued that Articles 35(3) and 55 “render permissible what before would have been 
forbidden” by lowering the standard of protection afforded to civilian objects due to the cumulative triple 
qualifier.120 In other words, the natural environment would enjoy more protection as a civilian object without 
the application of Articles 35(3) and 55. However, rather than lowering the standard of protection afforded 
to civilian objects, Articles 35(3) and 55 can be read as interpretive tools for determining when an attack is 
indiscriminate.121 For instance, when elements of the environment are military objectives, the means and 
methods used to directly target them must not cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
environment. When the environment qualifies as a civilian object, it must not be made the object of 
attacks.122 In this context, an attack that causes widespread, long-term and severe incidental damage to 
the environment would be deemed disproportionate and in violation of API.123 It can therefore be said that 
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API’s general prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and its provision limiting attacks to military objectives 
serve as additional protection of the natural environment during armed conflict.124  
 
Other provisions of API further protect the natural environment, albeit indirectly.125 Article 54 aims to protect 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population by prohibiting attacks on “foodstuffs, 
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies 
and irrigation works”.126 However, these objects’ immunity is not absolute and “imperative military necessity” 
may authorize their destruction.127 Article 56 prohibits attacks on “dams, dykes and nuclear electrical 
generating stations… even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release 
of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.”128 The provision also 
prohibits attacks on military objectives in the vicinity of such works or installations if the incidental damage 
would render the same effect as a direct attack.129 Nevertheless, API provides exceptions to this prohibition 
as well, namely, if the objects directly, “support military operations and if such attack is the only feasible 
way to terminate such support.130 Although Articles 54 and 56 indirectly protect the environment, they do 
not possess an ecocentric character and there fail to reflect contemporary environmental concerns.131  
 
ENMOD Convention  
ENMOD intends to protect the environment during armed conflict by prohibiting State Parties from 
“engag[ing] in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, 
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party”.132 
The limitations present in this formulation demonstrate that ENMOD was adopted in reaction to the artificial 
rainmaking techniques used by the United States during the Vietnam War rather than concerns about 
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wartime environmental destruction.133 First, the techniques prohibited by ENMOD are only those which 
change “the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth…through the deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes”.134 Yet with the exception of the United States’ weather modification program, the kind of 
manipulation that turns the environment into a weapon has yet to be conceived and is primarily the “subject 
of scientific speculation”.135 Second, because the manipulation of natural processes must be intentional, 
collateral damage resulting from an attack against a military objective is not captured. Consequently, 
causing toxic pollution by bombing a military target which contains chemicals is not prohibited by ENMOD, 
even though the negative effects of such action are more scientifically plausible.136 Third, ENMOD only 
prohibits the use of environmental modification techniques rather than their development.137 This gap is 
especially problematic because the Convention only applies to “hostile use” and therefore tolerates the use 
of environmental modification techniques for “peaceful purposes”, all while it failing to define these terms.138 
It follows that the deliberate but peaceful use of modification techniques that produces widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects is exempted from ENMOD. Similarly, the Convention allows the hostile use of 
modification techniques that produce destructive effects below the threshold.139 Fourth, ENMOD is only 
applicable to States that have ratified or acceded to the Convention and is therefore not applicable during 
NIACs.140   
 
The most notable limitation relates to the high threshold of destruction required before an act is condemned. 
According to the Committee on Disarmament, “widespread” means “an area on the scale of several hundred 
square kilometers”; “long-lasting” refers to “a period of months or approximately a season”; and “severe” 
entails “serious or significant disruption of harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other 
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assets.”141 The Committee also noted that its interpretation is intended exclusively for ENMOD and should 
not prejudice the interpretation of similar terms used in other international agreements, such as API.142 This 
was a critical observation, because API and ENMOD pursue different objectives. While API bans the use 
of methods and means of warfare that cause disproportionate damage to the environment regardless of 
weapons used, ENMOD only forbids the manipulation of the environment for hostile purposes.143 Moreover, 
under ENMOD damage must only be widespread, long-term or severe, whereas under API the effects must 
be cumulative.144 However, the API prohibition also includes objectively foreseeable collateral damage 
whereas ENMOD only prohibits intentional destruction. Given these limitations, ENMOD is unlikely to 
meaningfully protect the environment during armed conflict.  
 
IHL Treaties Regulating Means and Methods of Warfare 
Treaties that may provide indirect protection to the benefit of the environment include the (i) the Hague 
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and its accompanying Regulations (Hague 
Convention IV);145 (ii) the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol);146 (iii) the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC);147 (iv) the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);148 (v) the Certain 
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Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols (CCW);149 (vi) the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (Ottawa Treaty);150 and (vii) the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)151.  
 
Although the Hague Convention IV does not specifically reference the environment, it nevertheless provides 
that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”152 This provision read 
together with the prohibitions on “employ[ing] poison or poisoned weapons” and “destroy[ing] or seiz[ing] 
the enemy's property” can be applied in the context of protecting the environment.153 This interpretation 
would depend on elements of the environment qualifying as “enemy property”, which itself only enjoys 
protection “unless [its] destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.154  The 
Hague Convention IV can also protect elements of the environment during occupations, by requiring the 
occupying State to “safeguard [forests and agricultural estates] and administer them in accordance with the 
rules of usufruct”. This provision protects the environment indirectly because it prohibits the occupying Sate 
from permanently altering or destroying the properties named.155  
 
The Geneva Protocol protects fauna and flora during armed conflict by prohibiting “the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices” and “the use of 
bacteriological methods of warfare”.156 Although its effectiveness was initially limited by State reservations, 
the UNGA recognized that “the Geneva Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of international 
law” given the “direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants” of chemical and biological agents.157 The 
prohibitions declared by the Geneva Protocol were also further strengthened by the BWC and the CWC, 
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which state that chemical and biological weapons must “never under any circumstances” be developed, 
acquired or used.158 The CWC also outlawed the use of chemical weapons in retaliation chemical attack, 
which had been contemplated by reservations to the Geneva Protocol.159 However, unlike the Geneva 
Protocol, the CWC does not protect flora, as it is limited to those which “can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals”.160   
 
As an inherently anthropocentric framework convention, the CCW prohibits or restricts the use of certain 
conventional weapons that are excessively injurious to persons or have indiscriminate effects and 
consequently does not expressly protect the environment during armed conflict. Nevertheless, its third 
protocol on the restriction and use of incendiary weapons precludes making “forests or other kinds of plant 
cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, 
conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives”.161 Its 
fifth protocol, which addresses explosive remnants of war, can benefit the environment after hostilities have 
ceased by requiring the clearance of unexploded ordnance.162 Similarly, the Ottawa Treaty and the CCM 
can also indirectly protect the environment by banning the use of munitions that create craters in the soil, 
destroy arable land and disrupt wildlife.163  
 
Protection of the Environment during NIAC 
There is no IHL instrument that specifically addresses the protection of the natural environment in the 
context of an internal armed conflict.164 The few protections applicable during a NIAC stem from the IHL 
treaties banning chemical and biological weapons, which are applicable despite the nature of the conflict, 
and from customary IHL principles.165  This poses a significant gap, given that modern conflicts are primarily 
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internal.166 Neither Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions nor the Second Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions (APII), the two sources of IHL applicable to internal armed conflicts, address the 
protection of the environment. However, because APII does protect certain objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population as well as works and installations containing dangerous forces, it could 
indirectly contribute to preventing environmental harm from an anthropocentric perspective.167 Moreover, 
States engaged in a NIAC continue to be bound by peacetime IEL obligations, such as the no-harm principle 
prohibiting the means and methods of warfare that have serious transboundary effects.168  Nevertheless, 
the absence of codified environmental protections applicable during internal armed conflicts is a significant 
gap in IHL. 
 
Customary IHL  
In the absence of codified rules applicable to the natural environment during NIACs, the well-established 
customary principles of IHL, which are applicable in both international and internal armed conflicts, can 
provide substantial protection even though they do not address environmental issues specifically.169 
According to the limitation principle, as expressed in the Martens Clause, the right to injure one’s enemy is 
not unlimited.170 The principle of military necessity restricts parties to a conflict to using only the kind and 
degree of force necessary to overpower the enemy. The destruction of any element of the environment is 
therefore prohibited unless required by military necessity.171 According to the principle of distinction, parties 
to a conflict must always distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. 172 It follows that 
elements of the natural environment cannot be attacked unless they are military objectives.173 Launching 
an attack against a military objective that is expected to cause excessive collateral damage to the 
environment in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited by the 
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principle of proportionality.174 Proportionality therefore requires parties to a conflict to balance military 
objectives against the humanitarian interest of protecting the environment.175 The humanity principle 
advances an anthropocentric perspective to environmental protection by prohibiting damage to the 
environment that causes unnecessary human suffering.176 Finally, according to the precautionary principle, 
the environmental impact of a military attack must be assessed during the planning stage. Parties must 
therefore take measures to prevent damage even if the impact of an attack is scientifically uncertain.177 
 
Although the ICRC has interpreted Articles 35(3) and 55 of API as custom applicable in both IACs and 
NIACs, there is insufficient evidence of state practice and opinio juris to arrive at this conclusion.178 The 
ICRC relies on the language contained in various military manuals to suggest that means and methods of 
warfare intended or expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage are prohibited.179 
However, due to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom objecting to this proposition and 
to the fact that APII does not contain a prohibition similar to that found in API, this rule cannot be said to 
represent custom applicable in both types of armed conflict.180 In conclusion, because the precise content 
of IHL principles is vague and contested, as with other customary rules, it is difficult to enforce any concrete 
obligations that may derive from them.181  
 
IHL instruments only provide partial and inadequate protection of the natural environment during armed 
conflicts.182 Deficiencies in the treaties and customary principles that make up this body of law stem firstly 
from unclear definitions of like “the environment”.183 The texts of API and ENMOD, the two treaties directly 
addressing the environment during armed conflicts, do not provide a precise definition of the objects 
benefiting from their protection. Consequently, there are doubts as to whether the natural environment 
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enjoys protection as a civilian object.184 Moreover, there is lack of clarity about the meaning of “widespread, 
long-term and severe” and the high threshold of damage this phrase demands.185 Although these terms 
have been interpreted for the purposes of ENMOD, it is uncertain whether they have a similar meaning in 
the context of API.186 The language used is “both too stringent and too imprecise” to be used in practice.187 
With respect to customary principles, there is ongoing disagreement about their precise content.188 In 
particular, it is unclear how the principle of proportionality should apply to environmental damage in relation 
to incidental damage resulting from attacks against military objectives.189 However, the most significant 
deficiency in IHL instruments is their anthropocentric character and the resulting failure to protect the 
environment as such. It is due to the absence of ecocentric influences that the IHL instruments described 
in this chapter expressly allow the destruction of the natural environment during armed conflict on the 
grounds of military necessity.190  
 
The deficiencies of IHL instruments can be addressed by applying IEL principles during armed conflict to 
interpret the provisions relating to wartime environmental protection.191 This exercise is possible because 
the fundamental principles of IEL are compatible with those of IHL and because IHL is open to the influence 
of other international legal frameworks.192 The continued applicability of IEL during armed conflict was 
recently confirmed by the ILC in its study on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties.193 The ILC concluded 
that treaties do not automatically cease to operate during armed conflict and that, depending on their subject 
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matter, object and purpose, and content, peacetime treaties may continue to apply in parallel with IHL.194 
In practice, this would result in environmental concerns playing a greater role while balancing military 
objectives against humanitarian concerns.195 However, there is still uncertainly about the extent to which 
IEL can meaningfully contribute to enhancing wartime protection of the environment beyond inserting 
environmental considerations into the military assessments conducted prior to carrying out an attack.196 
 
iii. International Human Rights Law   
 
Beyond IEL and IHL, environmental concerns have been increasingly pursued through international human 
rights law (IHRL) instruments and institutions. This body of law has even been applied in the context of 
armed conflict because, as confirmed by the ICJ, non-derogable protections offered by IHRL instruments 
do not cease to apply during hostilities.197 This is notable, given the recent emergence of a separate human 
right to a healthy environment in IHRL.198 For instance, the African Charter recognizes that “[a]ll peoples 
shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.”199 Similarly, the 
right of everyone to “live in a healthy environment” has been recognized in the inter-American human rights 
system.200 Yet while some IHRL instruments adopted environment-focused rights, others have addressed 
environmental harms indirectly through the “greening” of other human rights which did not explicitly deal 
with environmental protection.201 For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
interpreted the right to health as encompassing “a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote 
                                                 
194 Silja Voneky, “A New Shield for the Environment: Peacetime Treaties as Legal Restraints of Wartime 
Damage” (2000) 9 Rev European Community & Intl Env L 20 in Karen Hulme (ed) Law of the Environment 
and Armed Conflict (Elgar Publishing 2017) 808; ibid arts 3 & 6. 
195 Bothe (n26) 105. 
196 Schafer (n191) 77. 
197 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) (Judgment) ICJ [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 216. 
198 James Cameron, “Compliance, Citizens and NGOs” in James Cameron et al (eds) Improving 
Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan 1996) 29 & 39. 
199 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986) 1520 UNTS 217(ACHPR) art 24. 
200 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (adopted 17 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series 
No 69 (1988) (Protocol of San Salvador) art 11(1).  
201 Merryl Lawry-White, “Victims of Environmental Harm During Conflict: The Potential for ‘Justice’” in 
Carsten Stahn et al (eds) Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace (OUP 2017) 
376. 
29 
 
conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, 
such as … a healthy environment.”202 This direction has equipped litigants with a rights-based language 
that could be used to bring environmental claims before established IHRL complaint mechanisms.203  
 
The growing jurisprudence of the UN rights-monitoring bodies and the specialized regional systems tasked 
with protecting IHRL has presented an opportunity for pursuing environmental claims at the international 
level.204 Although the adjudication mechanisms in human rights treaty systems can be both slow and 
expensive, their decisions can be legally binding and provide remedy to claimants affected by 
environmental damage.205 Moreover, the jurisprudence of IHRL mechanisms may also prove valuable in 
eventually prosecuting international environmental crimes.  
 
At the UN level, the Human Rights Committee has considered whether storing toxic waste violated the right 
to life of present and future generations206 and whether the use of genetically modified crops violated the 
right to live in a healthy environment.207 In Poma Poma v Peru, the Committee concluded that measures 
affecting indigenous communities’ access to vital natural resources violated their right to practice their 
culture.208  
 
In the African system, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights upheld the right to a general 
satisfactory environment as guaranteed under Article 24 of the African Charter.209 Although the decision 
was legally non-binding, the Commission urged States to take “reasonable measures to prevent pollution 
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and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure ecologically sustainable development 
and use of natural resources.”210 More recently, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights found 
that the rights of indigenous communities are closely linked to their ability to access the natural 
environment.211 Similarly, the regional African Courts have also issued decisions that protect the 
environment. In SERAP v Nigera, the ECOWAS Court of Justice found that Nigeria had failed its obligation 
to “enforce laws and regulations to protect the environment and prevent pollution” and ordered the 
government to “[t]ake all measure to prevent… damage to the environment; and to … hold the perpetrators 
of the environmental damage accountable.” 212 In ANAW v Tanzania, the East African Court of Justice 
considered “issues that are today the subject of wide debate across the world, including; environmental 
protection, sustainable development [and] environmental rule of law” and declared a proposed road project 
that would have cut across the Serengeti National Park to be unlawful because it would have “a negative 
impact on the environment”.213  
 
In the inter-American system, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently adopted an ecocentric 
view by recognizing an independent right to a healthy environment and finding that “forests, rivers and 
seas” are protected as such and that environmental damage could be justiciable even in the absence of 
evidence of harm to persons.214 Previous jurisprudence at the inter-American system had focused on the 
link between indigenous rights and environmental protection.215  
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In Europe, even though the Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not recognize an individual right to 
a healthy environment, the Court of Human Rights developed its environmental jurisprudence by 
recognizing that environmental damage and exposure to environmental risks may impact the exercise of 
other human rights enshrined in the ECHR.216 For instance, the Court has previously recognized that 
exposure to environmental harm can violate the right to life;217 the right to private and family life;218 and the 
right to property.219 The Court has also found that States have the positive obligation to impose substantive 
environmental quality standards on private actors to prevent them from interfering with individuals’ rights to 
health, private life or property.220  
 
Despite the growing jurisprudence of IHRL mechanisms, given the inherently anthropocentric perspective 
of human rights law, meaningful environmental protection is limited to situations when the objectives of 
safeguarding human rights and preserving the environment are complementary.221   
 
iv. Accountability for Violations of International Law  
 
In parallel with the development of international instruments that protect the environment during war, there 
is an emerging realization that institutions capable of enforcing these protections are necessary for 
                                                 
216 Preliminary Report (n13) para 160. 
217 Kolyadenko and Others v Russia, ECtHR (20 February 2012) App 17423/05, 20534/05, 20678/05, 
23263/05, 24283/05 & 35673/05. 
218 Lopez Ostra v Spain, ECtHR (9 December 1994) App 16798/90; Guerra and Others v Italy, ECtHR (19 
February 1998) App 116/1996/735/932; Taşkın and Others v Turkey, ECtHR (10 November 2004) App 
46117/99; Fadeyeva v Russia, ECtHR (9 June 2005) App 55723/00; Roche v United Kingdom, ECtHR 
(19 October 2005) App 32555/96; Giacomelli v Italy, ECtHR (2 November 2006) App 59909/00; Tătar v 
Romania, ECtHR (27 January 2009) App 67021/01; Brânduse v Romania, ECtHR (7 April 2009) App 
6586/03; Dubetska and Others v Ukraine, ECtHR (10 February 2011) App 30499/03; Brincat and Others 
v Malta, ECtHR (24 July 2014) App 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11, 62312/11 & 62338/11; Vilnes and 
Others v Norway, ECtHR (5 December 2013) App 52806/09; Cordella and Others v Italy, ECtHR (24 
January 2019) App 54414/13 & 54264/15.  
219 N.A. and Others v Turkey, ECtHR (11 October 2005) App 37451/97; O’Sullivan McCarthy Mussel 
Development Ltd v Ireland, ECtHR (7 June 2018) App 44460/16; Dimitar Yordanov v Bulgaria, ECtHR (6 
September 2018) App 3401/09. 
220 Beyerlin (n54) 401; Fredin v Sweden, ECtHR (18 February 1991) App 12033/86. 
221 Stephens (n55) 53. 
32 
 
promoting compliance.222 Enforcement refers to “the right to take measures to ensure fulfillment of 
international legal obligations” and can be achieved by “obtain[ing] a determination by an appropriate 
international court, tribunal or other body… that obligations are being fulfilled”.223 Compliance can be 
defined as “an actor’s behaviour that conforms to a treaty’s explicit rules”.224 The effectiveness of 
international laws can be evaluated in terms of the extent to which actors comply with their obligations.225 
Consequently, one of the primary objectives of IEL and IHL is to ensure that actors respect the laws 
protecting the environment.226 To facilitate compliance with international commitments, incentives include 
the imposition of liabilities upon actors who violate their obligations.227 However, to be effective, liabilities 
must be “credible and potent”, thereby making violation unattractive.228 
 
A violation of the laws previously discussed in this study can give rise to different forms of liability, including 
state responsibility, civil liability or criminal liability.229  Although it has also been proposed that trade 
sanctions are effective in ensuring compliance, this suggestion is controversial and beyond the scope of 
this study.230 States incur responsibility for environmental damage when their agents engage in conduct 
that breaches an international obligation arising from either treaty or custom.231 The state injured by such 
a breach is then entitled to request “full reparation for the [damage] caused by the internationally wrongful 
act”, which may take the form “ of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in 
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combination”.232 Notably, in an effort to improve institutional capacity to address environmental disputes, 
the ICJ adopted a specialized permanent Chamber for Environmental Matters in 1993.233 However, 
because no State ever requested that a case be dealt with in this Chamber, it ceased to exist in 2006.234 
This demonstrates the drawback of using the framework of State responsibility to enforce environmental 
obligations, given its reliance on States’ willingness to bring claims in international courts. Civil liability for 
environmental damage, a recently emerged concept in international instruments that establishes 
mechanism for financial compensation for harm caused, has also been criticized for failing to discourage 
potential breaches of international obligations.235 It therefore follows that international criminal law, as a 
form of individual liability, is better suited for responding to concerns about deterrence and is therefore a 
better mechanism for enforcing international laws applicable to the environment.236  
 
Although international criminal prosecutions for environmental damage remain uncommon, as the concept 
of “environmental crimes” is a recent development, this form a liability is well suited for facilitating 
compliance with international law.237 International criminal courts challenge the State-centered character of 
international law by allowing individuals to be held liable for intentional environmental damage.238 Criminal 
sanctions can have a better deterrent effect on belligerents because they hold one individual responsible 
rather than dispensing responsibility to an abstract entity, like a State; draws outrage to condemnable 
actions; and exposes the appropriate standard of behaviour.239 Moreover, international criminal 
prosecutions can play an important role in redressing wartime environmental damage as part of securing a 
sustainable peace.240 By helping re-establish the rule of law and bringing perpetrators to account, 
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international criminal law serves the international community.241 In conclusion, the imposition of individual 
criminal liability to intentional wartime environmental damage represents the best method for producing 
long-term compliance with IHL.242  
 
IV. Prosecuting the Destruction of the Natural Environment as a War Crime 
 
Having considered the extent to which treaty and custom-based international law addresses the destruction 
of the natural environment during armed conflict, this section will examine whether these principles of 
international law are enough to establish individual criminal accountability for such acts. In particular, the 
chapter will examine the ICC’s role in addressing the destruction of the natural environment as a war crime 
and whether the 2016 policy goals released by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), which demonstrated a 
willingness to consider crimes involving environmental destruction, can meaningfully contribute to this 
endeavor.243   
 
Despite the previously mentioned link between armed conflict and disastrous environmental destruction, 
wartime environmental damage has not been prosecuted at the international level since the Nuremberg 
Trials.244 In the Jodl Case, the Nuremberg Tribunal found General Alfred Jodl guilty of war crimes 
associated with scorched earth tactics which “completely destroyed” entire cities.245 In the Rendulic Case, 
the Tribunal considered war crimes involving the physical destruction carried out in order to rescue forces 
from a “strategically perilous situation”.246 Following these decisions, acts committed during armed conflict 
continued to cause environmental destruction in situations where the natural environment was intentionally 
targeted and where the environment was exploited to serve a means of warfare, because they were 
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tolerated as unavoidable collateral damage. However, as the international community has come to be 
increasingly concerned with protecting the natural environment, especially considering issues like climate 
change, the role of international courts in preventing environmental damage should be revisited.247  
 
i. The International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction  
 
As a permanent mechanism of international criminal justice that seeks to promote the values and norms 
universally accepted among the international community, the ICC is a valuable instrument that has the 
potential to foster compliance with international law by imposing individual criminal liability to intentional 
wartime environmental damage.248 Given that it has the power to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to 
crimes that occur at any time after the ICC Statute came into force on 1 July 2002, the values and norms it 
promotes will continue to evolve in the future in order to prevent impunity for those who commit 
“unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity”.249  As present threats to the natural 
environment have come to threaten the future wellbeing of humanity, it is important that international 
criminal law addresses environmental destruction as an atrocity that shocks human conscience.   
 
The ICC can only operate within the limits of its jurisdiction. It can exercise its jurisdiction in relation to 
specific crimes when (i) the alleged crime is committed on the territory of a State Party;250 (ii) a national of 
a State Party is alleged to have committed a crime;251 (iii) a crime that “appears to have been committed” 
is referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter;252 or (iv) a non-State Party lodges a declaration with the ICC Registrar, accepting the jurisdiction 
of the Court with respect to the “crime in question”.253 Moreover, the ICC only has jurisdiction with respect 
to crimes committed after 1 July 2002.254 If a State becomes a Party to the ICC Statute after this date, the 
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Court “may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
Statute for that State, unless that State” declares otherwise.255 
 
The ICC’s jurisdiction is also subject to the principle of complementarity, meaning that the international 
court operates as a mechanism of last resort and that national courts retain primary responsibility for 
prosecuting these crimes. According to the ICC Statute, a case is inadmissible before the court if (i) it is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State, unless the State is genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution;256 (ii) it has been investigated and the State has decided not to prosecute, 
unless the decision resulted from the State’s genuine unwillingness or inability to prosecute;257 or (iii) the 
case is insufficiently grave to justify further attention from the ICC.258  
 
Jurisdiction is also limited to crimes that are expressly provided in the ICC Statute.259 While the ICC Statute 
has jurisdiction in relation to crimes of genocide (as defined in Article 6); crimes against humanity (Article 
7); war crimes (Article 8);260 and crimes of aggression (Article 8bis), it does not include a specific “crime 
against the environment” under any of these crimes or as a stand-alone offence. This omission was 
addressed during the drafting of the ICC Statute, when it was suggested that damage to the natural 
environment would usually fall within the scope of other crimes already included in the draft text, and that, 
if that were not the case, the act would not meet the gravity threshold for an international crime.261 The ICC 
Statute therefore compromised by setting out the limited circumstances in which damage to the natural 
environment may constitute a war crime.262 
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a. Destruction of the Natural Environment under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) 
 
Under the ICC Statute, a war crime requires the presence of both a material element (actus reus) and a 
mental element (mens rea).263 The material elements of war crimes include the underlying conduct specified 
in Article 8 and the existence of either an international or internal armed conflict. In terms of the mens rea, 
the ICC Statute sets out the default mental element in Article 30, which specifies that, for individual criminal 
responsibility to apply, the material elements (actus reus) of the crime must be “committed with intent and 
knowledge”.264 A person is deemed to have intent where “[i]n relation to conduct, that person means to 
engage in the conduct”265 and where “[i]n relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”266 The ICC Statute defines 
knowledge as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events”.267 The default mens rea applies “[u]nless otherwise provided”, meaning that specific crimes may 
have mental element requirements that differ from the Article 30 standard.268 
 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) classifies “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflict, within the established framework of international law,” including “[i]ntentionally launching an 
attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause … widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated” as war crimes.269 To prosecute this crime, the OTP must establish that (i) the act 
took place within the context of an international armed conflict; (ii) the attack was intentional; (iii) the ensuing 
damage was widespread, long-term and severe; and (iv) the perpetrator had the knowledge that the 
damage would be “clearly excessive” in relation to a “concrete and direct overall military advantage”.270 
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Notably, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) only applies during an international armed conflict.271 Although earlier drafts of 
the ICC Statute had included similar provisions in Articles 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e), which are applicable during 
internal armed conflicts, this was ultimately omitted in the final version of the Statute.272 The drafters’ 
decision to exclude a corresponding crime applicable during NIACs mirrors the gap present in the Additional 
Protocols.273 With respect to the mental element of Article 8(2)(b)(iv), Article 30 of the ICC Statute applies 
as the standard requiring both knowledge and intent of the material elements.274 This is a departure from 
the text in API, which regulates means and methods of warfare that are “intended, or may be expected to” 
cause damage, but does not require that the effects be known.275 Another departure from the API text is 
that for the war crime to crystallize, the damage to the natural environment must be clearly exceed the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.276 According to the drafters, a “concrete and direct 
military advantage” is “foreseeable by the accused at the relevant time,… substantial and relatively close” 
and excludes advantages that are “hardly perceptible” or “only appear in the long term”.277  The phrase 
“clearly excessive” requires perpetrators to male a value judgment regarding the impact of damage based 
on the information available to them at the time.278 The drafters therefore entrusted the ICC to “respect 
judgments that are made reasonably and in good faith on the basis of the requirements of IHL.”279  
 
b. Destruction of the Natural Environment as an Underlying Act in Prosecuting Other War Crimes 
 
Beyond Article 8(2)(b)(iv), the ICC Statute can address damage to the natural environment indirectly by 
treating it as a material element of other crimes.280  For instance, during an IAC, environmental destruction 
could be prosecuted as the underlying act in the crimes of: (i) extensive destruction and appropriation of 
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property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;281 (ii) intentionally 
directing attacks against civilian objects;282 (iii) employing poison or poisonous weapons;283 (iv) pillaging a 
town or place, even when taken by assault;284 (v) employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases;285 or 
(vi) intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects 
indispensable to their survival.286 However, the success of this approach would depend on the ICC’s 
willingness to interpret the natural environment as property; a civilian object; or an object indispensable to 
human survival. While prosecuting environmental damage as the underlying act to other crimes may lead 
to similar results as prosecuting environmental destruction directly, this approach fails to protect the 
environment as an entity with intrinsic value.287 
 
Similarly, in the absence of a provision that directly addresses environmental damage during an internal 
armed conflict, the OTP’s only option is to prosecute environmental destruction as the underlying act in the 
crimes of: (i) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;288 (ii) ordering the displacement of the 
civilian population for reasons related to the conflict;289 (iii) destroying or seizing the property of an adversary 
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of conflict;290 (iv) employing 
poison or poisoned weapons;291 or (v) employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases.292 Even though 
these provisions do not mention the environment, they may serve as avenues for punishing certain types 
of environmental damage in limited circumstances.293 With respect to pillage, it is worth noting that the 
provision only focuses on appropriation of property for private or personal use – rather than its destruction 
– and does not criminalize seizures justified by military necessity.294 This therefore excludes some of the 
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damage caused to the environment.295 Moreover, for this approach to work, the ICC would have to interpret 
the environment broadly to qualify it as “property”.296 It is also problematic that while the intentional 
starvation of the civilian population is recognized as a war crime during an IAC, there is no analogous 
provision applicable to NIACs.297 This omission also contrasts the approach adopted in APII, which prohibits 
attacks on “foodstuffs, agricultural areas, … crops, livestock [and] drinking water installations”, which could 
encompass elements of the environment.298  Given these limited situations in which the OTP may prosecute 
environmental destruction as the material element of war crimes occurring during NIACs, it is evident that 
“international jurisdiction on ecological crimes in [NIACs] is factually nonexistent today”.299 
 
ii. The OTP’s Recent Policy Goals 
 
Despite the limited circumstances under which wartime environmental destruction can be prosecuted at the 
ICC, the OTP has indicated its willingness to prioritize crimes that are committed by means of or result in 
“the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, or the illegal dispossession 
of land.”300 The purpose of the 2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization was to itemize the 
considerations guiding “the exercise of prosecutorial discretion” in the selection of cases to be investigated 
and prosecuted.301 Generally, the OTP selects its cases based on the “gravity of the crimes, the degree of 
responsibility of the alleged perpetrators and the potential charges".302 While these criteria will continue to 
guide the OTP’s decisions to pursue a case, the policy acknowledged that the destruction of the 
environment is worth considering as a crime in itself and as an underlying act used in the commission of 
other crimes.303  
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Some commentators have further interpreted the policy as demonstrating the ICC’s readiness to prosecute 
corporate executives or investors for the environmental destruction caused by their business practices.304 
It therefore inspired groups to lodge cases with the OTP in relation to land-grabbing as an underlying act 
of crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction.305 Although the ICC has “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern”, which typically includes heads of state and 
political or military leaders, there are difficulties in ensuring that heads of corporate enterprises also face 
criminal liability before the international court.306 Arguments in favor of prosecuting corporate misconduct 
at the ICC point to the inadequacy of civil penalties or mere sanctions for addressing corporate misconduct 
and note that environmental damage caused by businesses can be as harmful as military attacks.307 In 
particular, multinational corporations involved in the mining and agricultural sectors play an active role in 
environmental destruction, whether during peacetime or armed conflict.308 While the ICC cannot pursue a 
corporate entity, as it only has jurisdiction over natural persons, the OTP’s recent Policy Paper can be 
interpreted as encouraging the prosecution of business officials.309 However, the OTP has always had the 
power to prosecute corporate officials involved in the commission of international crimes.310 In practice, 
there are practical challenges to prosecuting business officials before the ICC.311 First, even serious 
corporate misconduct may fail to reach the high gravity threshold required to constitute an international 
crime.312 Second, it will be difficult for the OTP to analyze the specialized evidence required to establish a 
link between corporate misconduct and ensuing environmental harm in the absence of expertise and in the 
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face of budget constraints.313 Finally, the uncertainty regarding the mental element required to establish 
criminal liability in these cases renders the prosecution of corporate misconduct before the ICC unlikely.314 
Consequently, the success of recent claims lodged before the ICC is uncertain, as the Policy Paper is not 
legally binding and does not formally extend the ICC’s jurisdiction. Rather, the OTP has declared a general 
interest in assessing existing offences in a broader context.315  
 
V. The Challenges of Prosecuting the Destruction of the Natural Environment as a War Crime 
 
i. Reflections of IHL Deficiencies in the ICC Statute    
 
The overriding challenge to prosecuting wartime environmental destruction is that the ICC Statute fails to 
meaningfully resolve the previously discussed deficiencies of IHL instruments applicable to the environment 
and instead replicates them. First, both the ICC Statute and the Elements of Crimes refer to the “natural 
environment” but provide no guidance in defining the terms.316 As in other IHL instruments, the environment 
is qualified as “natural” without providing any clarity on the purview of protection.317 It is therefore unclear 
whether the terms “civilian objects”, “property” or “objects indispensable to the survival of the population” 
also include elements of the environment. This lack of clarity is particularly problematic given how the few 
provisions that could address environmental damage during a NIAC use these terms. In response to how 
vague the terms applicable during NIACs are in relation to the environment, a defendant could argue the 
nullem crimen sine lege maxim, according to which “[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed 
and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of 
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted”.318 This point relates to the second deficiency of 
IHL reflected in the ICC Statute; namely, the failure to include war crimes explicitly related to environmental 
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destruction during internal armed conflicts.319 The exclusive application of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to international 
armed conflicts therefore presents a serious gap.320 Third, the crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute which 
are applicable to the environment adopt an anthropocentric view, similarly to other IHL instruments.321 This 
reflects the international community’s reluctance in acknowledging environmental crimes in the absence of 
a destructive humanitarian impact.322 Crimes that harm the environment are therefore treated as “victimless 
crimes”.323  As a result, impunity for environmental damage prevails when the environment is itself the 
victim.324 However, as previously mentioned, anthropocentric laws neglect the scientific reality that the 
wellbeing of humankind is dependent on the wellbeing of the environment. Therefore, “we are all harmed 
by crimes” that aggravate climate change or the loss of biodiversity.325 To meaningfully respond to these 
contemporary environmental challenges, the international criminal law should embrace an ecocentric value 
system.326 
 
Like Articles 35(3) and 55 of API, the ICC Statute uses imprecise but stringent language in Article 8(2)(b)(iv), 
which creates uncertainty about what level of environmental damage, if any, is prohibited. The material 
element of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is therefore difficult to establish. By requiring criminal damage to the natural 
environment to be widespread, long-term and severe, the ICC Statute departs from the standard specified 
in ENMOD, which only prohibited States from engaging “in military or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects” [emphasis added].327 Similarly, 
the ICC Statute requires that the damage be “clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated”328, whereas API only prohibited “the use of methods or means of warfare 
which are intended or may be expected to cause [damage] to the natural environment”.329 This indicates 
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that the degree of harm necessary to amount to a war crime under the ICC Statute is higher than that 
required to violate ENMOD or API. Moreover, some environmental destruction could breach API but not 
necessarily amount to a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv). This is especially evidenced by the requirement 
that damage must be “clearly” excessive.330 In balancing the expected environmental damage against the 
anticipated military advantage, the Article implies that environmental concerns are secondary to military 
interests.331 It therefore echoes the traditional and flawed approach that harm to the natural environment is 
an inevitable and tolerable consequence of armed conflict, even when the harm is intentional.332   
 
The ICC Statute does not define the terms “widespread”, “long-term” or “severe”. As previously mentioned, 
for the purposes of ENMOD, “widespread” was defined as encompassing an area of several hundred 
square kilometers; “long-lasting” as lasting for a period of months or a season; and “severe” as involving 
serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.333 
However, these interpretations were intended exclusively for ENMOD and are not necessarily applicable to  
the Statute.334 As the interpretations offered for the purposes of ENMOD and API should not be 
automatically transferred to the ICC Statute, the precise meaning of “widespread”, “long-term” and “severe” 
in the context of international criminal law remains unclear until the ICC itself has the opportunity to 
determine it.335  
 
Moreover, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) requires that the proportionality of the environmental damage be balanced in 
relation to the military advantage surrounding such actions. This requirement, absent from the API 
prohibition in relation to the natural environment, makes it more difficult and subjective to apply the 
provision. Therefore, even if damage to the natural environment is found to be widespread, long-term and 
severe, it could still fall short of a war crime if the anticipated military advantage of destroying it is 
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sufficient.336 Notably, the ICC Elements of Crimes provides that “[t]he expression ‘concrete and direct 
overall military advantage’ refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the 
relevant time” and that “[i]t reflects the proportionality requirement inherent in determining the legality of 
any military activity undertaken in the context of an armed conflict”.337 As the advantage of any act is to be 
determined on the basis of “the broader purpose” of the particular operation338, it is likely that Article 
8(2)(b)(iv), when read together with the Elements of Crimes, would tolerate many, if not all, decisions to 
intentionally target the environment.339 
 
VI. Alternatives to Prosecuting Environmental Destruction as a War Crime 
 
i. Prosecuting Environmental Destruction as Other Crimes under the ICC’s Jurisdiction 
 
Given the difficulties of prosecuting environmental war crimes as stand-alone violations, the OTP may 
consider prosecuting environmental destruction as conducted in furtherance of other crimes under its 
jurisdiction, including (i) crimes against humanity; (ii) genocide; or (iii) crimes of aggression.340 By 
prosecuting environmental destruction as a crime against humanity or genocide, the existence of an armed 
conflict is no longer required. In practice, this means that environmental damage can be considered in the 
context of either an IAC or a NIAC.341 This approach would also enable the OTP to sidestep the stringent 
conditions in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) while establishing a precedent for quantifying environmental damage.342 It 
could therefore serve as a first meaningful step towards prosecuting wartime environmental destruction as 
stand-alone violations.343  
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Crime Against Humanity 
A crime against humanity (CAH) is defined in the ICC Statute as any of a number of listed “acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack”.344 Even though CAH are focused on actions that cause direct harm to human 
wellbeing, environmental destruction could constitute one of the underlying acts when committed as part of 
an intentional widespread or systematic attack on civilians.345 Specifically, the “[d]eportation or forcible 
transfer of population”;346 or the commission of “[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” could arise from severe 
environmental degradation.347 Although a CAH does not require a nexus to armed conflict, because the 
OTP must demonstrate that the attack was widespread, systematic or pursuant to a State policy, this is a 
difficult crime to prove.348 Moreover, because this approach is limited to cases where environmental 
damage impacts humans, the OTP would be unable to prosecute purely environmental harm.349 
 
Genocide  
The crime of genocide is defined in the ICC Statute as any of five distinct “acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”.350 In the context of 
genocide, environmental destruction could constitute the underlying acts of “[c]ausing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group”;351 “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”;352 or of “[i]mposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group”.353 For example, the widespread use of scorched earth tactics and the poisoning of 
water resources for the purpose of destroying a protected group could amount to genocide.354 In Prosecutor 
v Al Bashir, the OTP sought to prosecute the intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring 
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about a group’s physical destruction through the underlying act of ruining and depleting natural resources 
on which the group relied.355 Although the Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed the charge for lack of evidence, it 
did not deny the connection between environmental destruction and genocide.356 The difficulty in 
prosecuting this crime, however, is in proving the specific intent to destroy a particular group.357 Although 
genocide does not require the presence of an armed conflict, the special intent would be difficult to prove 
in the context of environmental destruction.358 Moreover, because the crime is inherently anthropocentric, 
it can only be used to prosecute limited instances of environmental harm inflicted on human groups.359 
 
Crime of Aggression  
The crime of aggression entails the “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State”.360 As the potential acts of aggression enumerated in 
the ICC Statute all involve the use of armed force by one state against another, this crime would not apply 
in the context of a NIAC. Nevertheless, if a State were to send its armed forces to attack its adversary, the 
resulting environmental destruction could qualify under this definition.361 The drawback of this approach is 
that environmental harm caused by anything other than a military attack would not qualify as aggression. 
Moreover, because the crime can only be committed “by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State”, liability would be limited to individuals in a 
leadership position.362  
 
In considering whether environmental destruction could be prosecuted in furtherance of other crimes within 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, it becomes apparent that meaningful protection of the environment “cannot effectively 
be achieved simply by trying to ‘pigeon-hole’ such environmental concerns into … already existing core 
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international crimes”.363 Not only would such an approach diminish the scope of CAH and genocide, which 
are meant to address egregious international offences, but because these crimes only address incidental 
environmental destruction, it would also fail to secure meaningful protection for the environment.364  
 
ii. Amending the ICC Statute  
 
In the absence of a war crime directly addressing environmental destruction during internal armed conflicts, 
some commentators have suggested amending the ICC Statute to adopt a “mirror provision” to Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) that would apply during NIACs.365 Proponents of this solution argue that while the practical impact 
of such an amendment is uncertain, it would nevertheless play a “symbolic function” by reflecting the 
international community’s condemnation of environmental destruction during NIACs.366 Moreover, they 
point to the 2010 precedent when the Kampala Review Conference decided that poison weapons, 
asphyxiating gases and expanding bullets should not only be criminalized in IACs but also in NIACs by 
adding new paragraphs to Article 8(2)(e).367 However, simply adding a new but parallel war crime within 
Article 8(2)(e) of the ICC Statute in the context of environmental destruction would fail to address the 
previously mentioned deficiencies that were adopted from flawed IHL instruments.  
 
Other proposals have called for the introduction of a fifth and separate “crime against the environment”, or 
“ecocide”, under the ICC’s jurisdiction.368 Due to the transboundary effects of environmental damage, 
adopting a new international crime subject to the ICC’s complementarity principle is an appropriate measure 
for protecting the environment.369 Although the crime lacks a universally accepted definition, it has been 
proposed that it should address “extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystems of a given 
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territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the 
inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished”.370 Other proposals have adopted an ecocentric 
character by defining the crime as “the commission of specific intentional acts that threaten the security of 
the planet and are committed as part of a widespread or systematic action”.371 Rather than requiring a 
nexus with armed conflict, the law would be more effective as both a peacetime and wartime crime.372 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the crime could give the ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
both legal and natural persons, to enable the Court to address corporate misconduct more effectively.373 
Although such an amendment would ultimately require a shift in political will, given increasingly changing 
attitudes about the importance of protecting the environment during war, the opportunity for revision may 
soon present itself.374 
 
iii. Creating New Mechanisms to Impose Individual Criminal Liability  
 
Rather than amending the ICC Statute, some academics have proposed the establishment of a specialized 
international judicial body, or International Court for the Environment (ICE), to adjudicate environmental 
cases exclusively.375 It has been suggested that the ICE should have jurisdiction over environmental 
disputes even in the absence of express acceptance of its jurisdiction.376 Advocates for an ICE have also 
suggested that in addition to resolving individual complaints, the Court should possess criminal jurisdiction 
to prosecute environmental crimes.377 As a result, proposals for an ICE have been overly ambitious, as they 
envision “a court that bears little resemblance to any [other] judicial institution.”378 Moreover, the proposals 
are based on the flawed assumption that environmental disputes arise in isolation, when in fact 
environmental issues  implicate other subject matter, such as, for example, human rights.379 Given the 
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complexities involved in introducing a new institution in the already existing “patchwork of jurisdictions” 
applicable to the environment, it is more practical to improve existing laws and entrust existing courts, like 
the ICC, to prosecute environmental crimes.380  
 
With respect to improving existing laws, there have been recent appeals, from scientific and legal 
communities alike, to adopt a “Fifth Geneva Convention” related to environmental protection.381 Reflecting 
earlier calls for the drafting of such a legal instrument,382 the proposed convention would seek to protect 
the environment during armed conflict by preserving natural resources, safeguarding biodiversity, and 
holding members of the military more accountable for their wartime activities.383 In light of the limitations 
and challenges discussed in relation to preventing wartime environmental destruction, international criminal 
law and IHL can only provide complementary protection to the natural environment. To meaningfully 
address and limit the consequences of environmental harm, a varied approach incorporating principles of 
IEL and IHRL will therefore be necessary.384 
 
In conclusion, despite having historically tolerated wartime environmental destruction, the international 
community is increasingly concerned with protecting the natural environment during armed conflict. Efforts 
from institutions like the ICRC, the ILC and UNEP to clarify the rules protecting the environment during 
armed conflict demonstrate changing attitudes about tolerable wartime activities. These efforts also indicate 
a slow shift away from the anthropocentric approach and towards the recognition that human wellbeing is 
interconnected and dependent on the wellbeing of the environment. Having examined how different legal 
regimes protect the environment during armed conflict and identified the glaring deficiencies in the few 
applicable IHL instruments, this study turned to examine avenues for ensuring compliance with international 
obligations. The ICC was therefore presented as a valuable institution for addressing impunity for wartime 
environmental damage. The study examined the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction which could be used 
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to prosecute environmental destruction during armed conflicts. Due to the challenges of prosecuting 
environmental destruction as a war crime, including the lack of clarity regarding terms used in the ICC 
Statute and the absence of crimes applicable during internal armed conflicts, this study considered other 
alternatives. Having examined the possibility of prosecuting environmental damage as another crime under 
the ICC’s jurisdiction and creating new mechanisms to impose individual criminal liability, the study 
concluded that the international community would best be served by amending the ICC Statute to include 
a specific crime against the environment. Moreover, the continued application of the different legal regimes 
discussed in this study is particularly critical to ensuring the full protection of the environment during armed 
conflict.  
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